"Responsibility-Sensitive Quotas in the Fishery Industry"

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Abstract:

This article examines the effect - in the fisheries sector - of a transition from a regulation system called limited entry (LE) to a system of individual transferable quotas (ITQ). It is recognized that such a transition increases the aggregate resource rent. But it also has redistributive effects, as a direct consequence of the chosen allocation of individual fishing quotas. The first question that comes to mind - and that has been the scholar's main focus so far - is whether such a transition could be a Pareto improvement? Our originality is to go further and to analyze the redistributional consequences of this transition from the point of view of the ethics of responsibility. The objective to neutralize - or at least to dampen - inequalities that are due to the influence of circumstances beyond fishermen's responsibility. What are the difficulties (if any) in combining Pareto improvements with the ethics of responsibility? We propose an exploration into the formal logics of interactions between those two requirements. Some ethical dilemmas are highlighted and compromises are suggested.